notes on Mitchell's "American Awakening"
A big chunk of Joshua Mitchell's book is about "identity
politics" (introduced in the preface and developed throughout the book).
Included in this is a comparison to Christianity. Mitchell (xix) notes that
universities were based on Greek ideals of knowledge and wisdom—and have
ironically moved back toward "the Christian fixation on transgression and
innocence" (and even, a version of "original sin").
Unfortunately, this new religion painfully operates without God, grace, or
forgiveness. Later, Mitchell refers to this as "spiritual eugenics"
(xx) and our times as another "American Awakening" (41).
As is clear from the aftermath of Adam and Eve falling
into various temptations in Genesis 3, there is something fundamental in our
desire to shift blame and evade personal responsibility. C.S. Lewis has a
number of poignant observations about how we hold others to higher standards
than ourselves. Of course, Jesus speaks to this temptation as well—and calls us
to judge others and ourselves proportionately. Likewise, in contrast to
Christian norms, Mitchell (200) observes that "...identity politics finds
the Christian shortcut too difficult to endure, for it demands that man be hard
on himself and admit both his stain and his inability to remove it without
Divine assistance." One mark of a bad religion is holding others up to a
high standard while letting ourselves off the hook.
Mitchell (xx) is also helpful in teasing out the
religious aspects of politics as often practiced today. "Americans have
not lost their religion. Americans have relocated their religion to the realm
of politics. The institutional separation of church and state may be largely
intact, but the separation between religion and politics has largely collapsed.
More precisely, with respect to the matter of presumption of guilt and
innocence, they have traded places. Once, because of the doctrine of original
sin, there was a presumption of guilt in the churches, and because of our legal
history, a presumption of innocence in the realm of politics. Today, [we are]
lifting the burden of guilt in the churches and [are] shifting it to
politics."
Mitchell also makes a series of related miscellaneous
observations:
-Adherents of this religion feign guilt, but they
always arrange for others to pay the price. Here, Mitchell (xxxii) cites
William Voegeli who observed that no white Leftists have given up their
positions to be replaced by someone from an oppressed, under-represented group:
they "reliably devise penances that will be performed by other
people."
-The ideological mishmash of LGBTQ+ can only be
coherently unified by describing "white cis-gen males" as scapegoats
(87). As a comparison, Mitchell (94) cites Orwell's "Two Minute
Hate" toward Emmanuel Goldstein in 1984.
-Mitchell reminded me about details on racial
classifications in the Census (which I learned about in David Bernstein's
books: Black and mulatto were included in 1850; proportions of
"blackness" up to 1/8th were measured in 1890; all of this was
discarded in 1900 (79); and "Hispanic" was added as a category in
1970 (82).
-Mitchell (230) reminds us that Trump was roundly
called a racist for shutting down airline flights from China early in Covid-19—what
Mitchell rightly observes (along with Bill Maher: https://youtu.be/dEfDwc2G2_8)
should have been labeled the "Wuhan flu".
-Mitchell provides a nice description of the
simplistic, clean "analysis" inherent to various forms of
fundamentalism—e.g., as is often seen in environmentalism (192-193).
-Prophetically as per the 2024's election results,
Mitchell (65) wonders how Dems can win any more elections while believing and
saying publicly that white voters are stained. With the increasing Left-based
racism of the last decade or so, Dem political success (such as it has been)
may be mostly explained by the onset of Covid and the GOP running a flawed
character like Trump. If the Dems can't reverse their dramatic and public move
from "working class" issues to Leftist "identity politics",
they may spend a good chunk of time in the electoral wilderness.
-Really provocative to me: Mitchell describes tariffs
as a strategy to promote a nationalistic identity. As an economist, I'm used to
seeing and describing the (cronyistic) benefits and (larger) costs of trade
restrictions—in largely economic terms. But Mitchell ties them into broader
psychological and cultural concerns—and ironically, links them to identity
politics. In his words, identity politics "establishes interpersonal
tariffs, intended to protect the identity bearer's fragile interior" (25).
Interestingly, economic tariffs do the same thing for populists and
nationalists on the Right.
Mitchell develops two other big ideas. The first was amusing and interesting, but not of great use to me in my work—his pokes at "management society and selfie man" (140ff). The second was powerful for me in understanding the world and some of the people around me. He argues that many things are wonderful as supplements, but detrimental if they become substitutes for the real or greater thing (147ff). He provides a long list and I'll add a few more: GPS instead of geographical literacy and understanding maps; reliance on calculators while increasing innumeracy; using medication and surgery as substitutes for diet, exercise, and other healthy practices; weapons as a substitute for diplomacy or fighting skill; social media trumping personal relationships; Amazon replacing storefronts; and on-line education driving out face-to-face classroom experiences. Of course, AI opens a grand new frontier of temptations in this regard. The wise person will work to limit the subsequent problems while embracing its benefits.