Friday, November 7, 2008

Hoover = Bush and FDR = Obama?

It's odd that I had this thought the evening before the WSJ published an essay on this by Russell Roberts. Then, they followed up with a Tuesday front-page feature article on Hoover fans by Louise Radnofsky.

The funny thing is that if you've bought into the propaganda on Hoover and FDR, you would imagine that I mean this to be an insult of Bush because he did so little to deal with economic troubles-- and applause of FDR (and potentially, Obama) for fixing an economic mess.

If so, then alas, you don't know me, economics, or economic history very well.

Hoover has an undeserved reputation for being laissez-faire. In fact, he tried a wide and impressive array of govt interventions. His efforts do pale in comparison to FDR's, but Hoover cannot qualify, by any objective measure, as a do-nothing, free-market president. FDR mostly took Hoover's ideas and hooked them to steroids.

Likewise, FDR has an undeserved reputation as an economic guru. Instead, the New Deal can be potentially commended only in political terms-- the argument that if FDR had not done all this crazy stuff, then revolution and hard-core socialism would have resulted. I don't know enough about that argument to debate it. But as economic policy, it was clearly a short-term failure and its long-term ramifications have been amazingly costly. The latter is too long of a tangent to pursue here. As for the former, it suffices to say that unemployment in the 7th year of the New Deal was still 19%.

One other tidbit: there's an old saw that the Socialists in America have never been successful in an electoral sense. But their entire 1928 platform was put into law by FDR and his Congresses five years later.

Back to the possibilities of a contemporary comparison: For a long time, when teaching on the Great Depression, students have asked whether it was possible again. I've always said, "No, there's no way we'd repeat the series of bonehead policies that deepened and extended the Great Depression." Expansive fiscal policy (in the name of jobs and recovery), bad monetary policy, four tax increases, massive restrictions in international trade (Smoot-Hawley), a range of policies that strengthened unions, and wage/price controls. We've already had an amazing dose of the first and significant dabbling in the second. Today, we see calls for more of those two-- as well as the next three. Beyond that, there is now the potential to achieve this set of policies with the current political alignment (at least until blow-back in 2010)-- and most frightening, the public's potential willingness to go along with it (taking us beyond 2010).

What will happen-- and what will history say?

Stay tuned...

6 Comments:

At November 7, 2008 at 2:01 PM , Blogger William Lang said...

Today, GM announced that they're going to run out of money in the first half of 2009; Ford is in grave danger as well. I don't think Obama will be able resist the pressure to intervene. Has any economist attempted to model what would happen if our auto makers fail?

 
At November 7, 2008 at 3:52 PM , Blogger Eric Schansberg said...

Not sure...probably-- but also not sure how good a model would be. As I was telling my class last night, anything in the middle of the "market structure" spectrum is a "special case".

You're probably right, but I sure hope not. Taxpayers and consumers have subsidized the car industry (workers and investors) for a long time. They need their cost structures put back in line with reality. But the unions may have too much clout to allow that to happen.

 
At November 10, 2008 at 9:39 AM , Blogger William Lang said...

I happened across a study that was just released concerning what would happen if the automakers collapsed: Center for Automotive Research estimates the economic impact of a full or partial contraction of the Detroit Three on the United States economy. It sounds bloodcurdling: 3 million jobs lost within one year. (This was mentioned in a Newsweek article by Keith Naughton, Detroit: Begging For Help.)

 
At November 10, 2008 at 9:52 AM , Blogger Eric Schansberg said...

The link goes to an executive summary, but I think I get the gist of their effort.

Such numbers are notoriously difficult to calculate, but the short-run numbers ought to be relatively clean-- assuming the dissolution of an entire industry and a certain multiplier effect.

But is complete dissolution the correct assumption? And in the long-run, we would expect all sorts of adjustments that would be difficult to predict-- e.g., how long would it take people to get re-employed? And I don't see anything about the cost to the economy of a govt bailout. More broadly, I would worry about the objectivity of what may be an interest-group think tank.

All that said, of course it would be traumatic to lose one of our larger industries-- or for a large company to take a big hit.

One other consideration: the domestic car companies clearly have cost structures which are unsustainable and out-of-line with the rest of the industry. The easiest, most efficient, and most equitable way to fix this would be to deal with the underlying issue. It's easy and efficient because it would fix the problem instead of band-aiding it yet again. It's equitable because it's not equitable to take your money to prop them up further.

What it would take, specifically? I'm not sure. I'll post some back-of-the-envelope numbers on this soon.

 
At November 10, 2008 at 1:22 PM , Blogger William Lang said...

I would be interested in seeing a break-down as to what the domestic automakers' costs are, to see if they have any way of lowering them significantly. How much of their costs are high union salaries, versus things they don't really have control over, such as health care or their pension funds?

 
At November 10, 2008 at 2:31 PM , Blogger Eric Schansberg said...

I think I know what you mean, but of course, they have control over all of those things.

The seemingly easiest thing would be to reduce compensation (wages and fringe benefits) for current workers.

It would be more problematic to change deferred compensation. But if they're going to go bankrupt, then the pensions are toast anyway. And if the choice is hold gun to your head and take your money to subsidize someone's pension, that is in itself problematic. So, for example, perhaps the company could pay .70 on the dollar as part of a compromise. It's a difficult thing-- ethically and efficiently-- if the workers and the company agreed to something that later becomes untenable.

 

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